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Maximum Individual & Vicinity-Average Dose
for a Geologic Repository Containing
Radioactive Waste
Thomas H. Pigford*

Introduction
International practice protects the public from nuclear radiation by
ensuring that the reasonable maximum radiation dose received by a
member of the public is less than a specified limiting dose. 1 However,
recent proposals 2 would adopt a new less stringent standard for
protecting public health from geologic disposal of radioactive waste.
The proposed standard would be much more lenient than dose limits
now in use in this country and abroad. 3 Here we consider the
proposals to calculate an average dose to a future (and unknowable)
population in the general vicinity and to allow that average dose as large
or larger than what we now limit for the reasonable maximum exposure
to individuals. In so doing, the many people exposed to above-average
doses would be unprotected. Also, the proposed "vicinity-average dose"
Dr. Pigford is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at
the University of California, Berkeley. He received his B.S. (Chem. Eng.) and went on
to earn his master's and doctorial degrees from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
1 See, e.g., Carl A. Johnson, National Reseach Council Report "Technical Bases
for Yucca Mountain Standards"-A State of Nevada View, Proceedings International
Conference on High-Level Waste Management, Las Vegas (1996).
2
U.S. Congress HR-1020 (Fred Upton 1995), S-167 (Bennett Johnston 1995), S1271 (Larry Craig 1996); Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), A Proposed
Public Health and Safety Standard for Yucca Mountain: Presentation and Supporting
Analysis (1994); Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI Comments on Behalf of the Nuclear
Industry on Selected Findings and Recommendations of the NAS Report, Technical
Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, (1995) and John H. Kessler, Initial EPRI
Reaction to the NAS Yucca Mountain Standards Recommendations, Proceedings
International Conference on High-Level Waste Management, Las Vegas (1996).
3 Thomas H. Pigford, Personal Supplementary Statement, Appendix E, Technical
Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, (1995); Thomas H. Pigford, The Yucca
Mountain Standard: Proposals for Leniency, Proc. Materials Research Society:
Scientific Basis for Radioactive Waste Management (1995) and Thomas H. Pigford,
The Yucca Mountain Standard: How Lenient Should if Be? Proceedings
International Conference on High-Level Waste Management, Las Vegas (1996).
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standard has ill-defined notions of a future population "in the
vicinity." 4 It would invite manipulation, such as increasing the
"vicinity" size, to obtain lower calculated radiation doses.
People living outside the vicinity can also be exposed to
radioactivity from the geologic repository, by consuming contaminated
food grown in the vicinity near Yucca Mountain and by importing
water extracted from wells in the vicinity. For example, a 1994 proposal
by Amargosa Resources Inc. would purchase rights to ground water in
the Amargosa Valley, to supply more water to Las Vegas. 5 By
protecting the subsistence farmer who could use the most contaminated
water near Yucca Mountain, individuals outside the vicinity would
6
receive lower individual doses and would also be protected.
The Effect of the Proposed Vicinity-Average Dose Limit
on Concentration of Radioactivity in Ground Water
The traditional subsistence-farmer calculation of dose, together
with dose limits in the range of 10 to 100 mrem/year, 7 effectively
limit the concentration of key radionuclides in ground water near a
geologic repository. Over two decades ago the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) adopted 10 mrem/year to the public as the design
criterion that controls radiological emissions from nuclear power
plants. 8 It is appropriate to adopt 10 mrem/year as the U.S. design
criterion for a geologic waste repository, 9 tenfold lower than the 100
4 The proposed legislation speaks vaguely of limiting the exposure of "an average
member of the general populaton in the vicinity of the Yucca Mounain site." Simi ar
words are used in recommendations by the EPRI, supra note 2 (EPRI and Kessler).
From EPRI's account of how it would calculate the exposure (dose), as discussed in
detail in the present report, it is evident that what is meant is the average individual
dose, averaged over the entire population in the vicinity. Clearly, this is the "vicinityaverage" dose.
5 Mary Hynes, Group Wants to Grab Water from Amargosa Valley, Las Vegas
Review Journal, May 12, 1994.
6 Protecting individuals according to an individual dose limit would not necessarily
ensure suitable protection of large populations. Protective criteria for cumulative
population doses have been included in the proposals reviewed herein.
7 Robert W. Fri et al., Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards (1995).
8 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appx. I (1996), NRC, Numerical Guides for Design
Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion "As Low as
is Reasonably Achievable" for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents
initially promulgated May, 1975.
9 Thomas H. Pigford et al., A Study of the Isolation System for Geologic Disposal
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mrem/year limit recently proposed1 0 for geologic repositories. Both
the proposed higher dose limit of 100 mrem/year and the new
proposed lenient method of calculating doses to compare to that limit
will allow higher concentrations of contaminants in ground water.
Focusing only on the vicinity-average dose violates the longestablished principle in protecting public health from radiation. The
International Commission on Radiological Protection emphasizes that
calculations should be made of the maximum individual dose.11 The
individual receiving that dose should be protected, so that all other
individuals will be protected. In the present report, the person receiving
that calculated maximum dose is referred to as the "reference
subsistence farmer" (see the Appendix for discussion of various
interpretations of "maximum individual doses").
Probability of a Well Intersecting Contaminated Ground Water
The following quantitative estimates illustrate the maximum
radiation dose that could be experienced if the vicinity-average dose
were to be as high as that now proposed. Vicinity-average doses are
calculated based on probabilities of locations and habits of future
12
people, as estimated by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
and its consultant. 13 The maximum dose is calculated for a reference
subsistence farmer who uses contaminated well water withdrawn from
near the repository for drinking water and for growing a substantial
portion of his food. 14 One of the probabilities that EPRI estimates is
the probability that any well drilled in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain
to supply water could intersect ground water contaminated by
radioactivity from a repository at Yucca Mountain.
of Radioactive Wastes (1983).
10 Supra note 2.
11 In the modern terminology of the EPA, we speak of "the reasonable maximum
exposure," where exposure is measured by dose.
12 See EPRI supra note 2.
13 Robert E. Wilems, Illustrative Probabilistic Biosphere Model For Yucca
Mountain Individual Risk Calculations,Proceedings Waste Management 1994.
14 Comparing the calculated subsistence-farmer to a specified limit is the practice
now in effect for waste-disposal projects in the U.S. and in Sweden, Finland, UK,
Switzerland, Canada, and Japan; see, e.g., Robert W. Andrews, Timothy F. Dale &
Jerry A. McNeish, Total System Performance Assessment - An Evaluation of the
Potential Yucca Mountain Repository, Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project,
INTERA, Inc. (1994).
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Most of the radioactivity that will ultimately be released from
Yucca Mountain will appear in a ground-water aquifer flowing beneath
Yucca Mountain. There is a predictable flow direction for that aquifer,
and people now live and farm 20 or more miles downstream. However,
many of the future residents could reasonably be expected to live in
other directions away from Yucca Mountain, where they might receive
lower doses. 15 The probability that a future person will be exposed to
contaminated ground water is the ratio of the dose averaged over all
individuals in the entire vicinity to the maximum dose received by
individuals who use contaminated ground water. Other probabilities
estimated by EPRI that could further reduce the calculated average
dose are discussed later.
EPRI's calculational method assumes that these future people are
uniformly distributed over the vicinity, except for an unpopulated
exclusion area of four mile radius surrounding the repository. EPRI
assumes a repository one mile in radius, and it assumes that the future
population to be considered will live in a disk-shaped area extending
from four to fourteen miles. For clarity, one can first assume that all
future people are subsistence farmers. EPRI assumes that the number of
wells per unit area is proportional to population density. Multiplying
the calculated area by the assumed population density (people per
square mile) will yield the total number of people to be considered.
EPRI next assumes that the undergrrond plume of contaminated
water is two miles wide (the breadth of the repository), that it spreads
in the direction of ground-water flow, that all radionuclides remain in
this rectangular plume, and that the concentration of contaminants is
essentially constant throughout the plume. Transverse dispersion is
neglected. For long-lived radioactive contaminants a nearly constant
concentration of contaminants in the plume will be reached after very
long operation of the repository. All subsistence farmers living above the
underground plume are assumed to extract and use ground water.
They will receive the maximum radiation dose (within the assumptions
of this calculation). Those not living over the large rectangular plume
will receive no dose.
15 Transport of contaminated ground water to other locations for irrigation is
neglected in EPRI's calculational model.
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Thus, the probability that any person in the vicinity will receive the
maximum dose is the ratio of the number of people living directly
above the plume to the total number living in the vicinity. This is the
ratio of average to maximum dose, assuming all people are subsistence
farmers. In calculating that ratio, the population density cancels out and
the dose ratio is simply the ratio of plume area to total vicinity area. For
EPRI's assumptions, that ratio is:
vicinity-average dose = plume area = b(r2 - r1 )
maximum dose

where

vicinity area

ir(rj - r1 2)

b

=

7r(r1 + r2 )

b is the breadth (width) of the repository footprint
r1 is the inner radius of the population zone
r2 is the outer radius of the population zone

Using the EPRI parameters of b = 2 miles, r1 = 4 miles, and r2 = 14
miles, we obtain the dose ratio of 0.035. The reciprocal of 0.035 is 28,
which is the ratio of maximum dose to vicinity-average dose of this
assumed population.
If the safety limit is specified so that the allowable average dose is
100 morem/year, 16 the maximum dose would be 2,800 mrem/year
(2.8 rem/year). 1 7 This far exceeds the 10 mrem/year, the typical limit
for the reasonable maximum individual exposures for public in the
vicinity of licensed nuclear facilities in the U.S.
Future people could live closer to the repository than the 4-mile
limit assumed by EPRI. Institutional controls on where future people
can live cannot be expected to endure for the long times involved in
dose calculations. 18 Also, persons living more than 14 miles away
should be included. Therefore, we will repeat EPRI's calculation but
assume no exclusion area (other than the repository itself). 19 It is
16 See L M. Barraclough, S. F. Mobbs & J. R. Cooper, Radiological Protection
Objectives for the Land-Based Disposal of Solid Radioactive Wastes, 3 Documents of

the National Radiation Protection Board No. 3 (1992); P. A. Davis et al., The
Disposal of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste: The Biosphere Model, BIOTRAC, for
Postclosure Assessment (1992) and W. T. Farris et al., Columbia River Pathway

Dosimetry Report, 1944-1992, Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project,
Pacific Northwest Labs (1994).
17

Throughout we illustrate "dose" by quoting values of the annual dose.

18 See Fri et al., supra note 7. 19 Drilling a well into the repository is treated as human intrusion. Because of the
possibility of bringing cuttings of solid radioactive waste to the surface, a different
calculational approach is appropriate; see Andrews et al., supra note 14.
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better to assume an outer radius of at least 35 miles, the distance to the
nearest surface water in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. The result is a
value of 0.018 for the ratio of average to maximum dose. Allowing an
average dose of 100 mrem/year would result in a calculated maximum
dose of 5,600 mrem/year (5.6 rem/year). At this unacceptable dose
level there would be a chance of roughly 1 in 8 for the exposed person
to suffer a lifetime cancer fatality.
Similarly, if an outer-zone radius of 100 miles is assumed, a dose
ratio of 0.0063 results. For an average-dose limit of 100 mrem/year,
the corresponding maximum individual dose would be 15,000
mrem/year (15 rem/year).
Early Time Corrections
The dose ratios calculated above represent steady-state calculations,
assuming that the contaminant plume has progressed to the assumed
outer boundary of the vicinity. However, contaminated ground water is
expected to move slowly towards the environment beyond Yucca
Mountain. During early times, when the underground contaminant
front has propagated only a short distance beyond the edge of the
repository footprint, fewer wells will intersect contaminated ground
water. As compared to the steady-state calculations, there will be less
chance that any well in the general vicinity will produce contaminated
water for farming than later, when the contaminant plume extends to
the outer boundary. The location probability will be lower, as will the
ratio of average dose to maximum dose. For example, for a plume
length of only 3 miles, repository breadth of 2 miles, and vicinity outer
radius of 35 miles, the ratio of vicinity-average dose to maximum dose
would be 0.0016. If a dose of 100 mrem/year is allowed for the
vicinity-average individual, a farmer using water extracted from the
contaminant plume could receive an individual dose of 62,000
mrem/year (62 rem/year).
Validity of EPRI's Calculational Model
EPRI's calculational model that led to the above equation for the
vicinity-average dose is based on a rough approximation of the
underground contaminant plume. It requires a long period of constant
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rate of release of contaminant from the repository into the lower
aquifer. This is a good approximation for solubility-limited
radionuclides. Errors for the soluble fission products have not been
evaluated. EPRI's method requires that the half lives of the key
radionuclides be long compared to the transport time from the
repository to the outer radius of the population "vicinity". The key
radionuclides (Tc-99, 1-129, Np-237, etc.) meet this criterion.
EPRI assumes no transport of radionuclides by dispersion away
from the assumed rectangular plume. Although coefficients for
transverse dispersion are typically small, the long times involved can
result in appreciable dispersive transport. The contaminant plume will
then appear more as a cigar shape rather than a rectangle. The
concentration of the key radionuclides will then decrease with distance
away from the repository, and the location of maximum concentration
and dose will be near the repository. However, the steady-state
concentration is not expected to decrease markedly over a distance of
several miles in the direction of ground-water flow. Dispersive
broadening of the contaminant plume does not necessarily cause a large
change in the dose ratio calculated from EPRI's rectangular-plume
model. In calculating the dose ratios estimated above, dispersion will
not only decrease the average dose to some of the people living over the
stylized rectangular plume, but it will also increase the average dose to
people who live outside the rectangle. More detailed calculations of
dispersive transport show that the dose ratio calculated by EPRI's
rectangular-plume model can be a useful approximation, if the other
stated assumptions are satisfied.
EPRI's model for the above calculation is clear if one assumes that
all people are subsistence farmers. However, only a fraction of the
people are expected to be subsistence farmers. For a given concentration
of contaminant in ground water, introducing that fraction will not
reduce the calculated dose to the reference subsistence farmer.
However, there will be additional people who may be less exposed to
radioactivity. If all such people are assumed to obtain their water and
food from noncontaminated sources, the vicinity-average dose will be
reduced by that fraction. Thus, for an allowable vicinity-average dose,
both the allowable contaminant concentration and the calculated
8 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 9 [Winter 1997]

subsistence-farmer dose will correspondingly increase. For example,
assume a 35-mile outer radius of the vicinity, and assume 10% of local
people are subsistence farmers. For an allowable 100 mrem/year
vicinity-average dose, the corresponding subsistence-farmer dose at
steady state would be 56 rem/year. It appears that this correction for
population dilution may not have been included in EPRI's calculations.
Subject to the assumptions of EPRI's calculational model, the
"location probability" that any well in the vicinity will intersect the
contaminant plume does have a scientific basis for relating the "vicinityaverage dose" to the reference subsistence-farmer dose.
Further Reduction in Average Dose by Postulated Habits
of Future People
The above calculations are based on assumptions of the location of
future people. EPRI's method assumes that all persons exposed by
using contaminated ground water have the same diets and living habits,
e.g., all are subsistence farmers. However, EPRI goes further.2 0 They
postulate several additional probabilities that could further reduce the
calculated doses below the dose calculated for a subsistence farmer. For
example, EPRI proposes that a person might reside in the area for only
part of his lifetime. Not all persons living over the contaminated plume
will be subsistence farmers. Some of the water and food consumed
could be derived from noncontaminated sources, such as bottled water.
Wells penetrating the contaminated plume might not extract
contaminated water. The presence of contamination in ground water
could be detected, resulting in postulated decontamination of the water
or greater use of water from other sources. These are "habit
probabilities", which are EPRI's guesses of the probabilities that doses
to future individuals who could be exposed to contaminated ground
water will not be reduced below that of the subsistence farmer. These
are distinct from the "location probability" that any well in the vicinity
will intersect the contaminant plume, as outlined above.
In the context of EPRI's report, the habit probabilities can be
interpreted as EPRI's guesses of the ratio of average dose to all people
20

See D. Charles & G. M. Smith, Project 90 Conversion of Releases From the

Geosphere to Estimates of Individual Doses to Man, Swedish Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, SKI Technical Report 91:14 (1991).
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who live over the contaminated plume to the subsistence-farmer dose.
A low habit probability does not mean that the reference subsistence
farmer would not exist. It means that there might be fewer subsistence
farmers relative to all other individuals who receive lower doses.
Therefore, the dose to the reference subsistence farmer will still be
included in the dose calculations.
EPRI does not base these probabilities on scientific grounds. 2 1 It
points out that the limited quantity of water in the vicinity of Yucca
Mountain makes it likely that the population that depends solely on
groundwater for its water needs will be limited in size. One of the habit
probabilities reflects the assumed technology for detecting radioactivity
and clean-up of well water before use, expected by EPRI to be more
effective for a future population with advanced technology. 22 For a
small population, more appropriate for the Yucca Mountain vicinity, it
postulates net habit probabilities of 0.11 assuming present technology
and 0.0038 for advanced technology. Each value would multiply the
probability of intersecting the plume, as calculated above, to result in
even lower vicinity-average dose relative to the subsistence-farmer dose.
Thus, the corresponding ratios of average dose to maximum dose and
the maximum dose that could result if the allowed average dose is 100
mrem/year (0.1 rem/year) are listed in Table 1.
The annual doses of 50 rem and 1,400 rem that could theoretically
be received by the reference subsistence farmer are of uncertain
reliability, because the habit probabilities are only EPRI guesses.
Further, for doses in the range of hundreds of rem and above, radiation
21 EPRI's guesses of habit probabilities are used here only to illustrate the
consequences of adopting a probabilistic approach for estimating habits of future

people. The report, supra note 7, endorses estimating such probabilities based on
assumed habits of future people. It does not believe that there is scientific basis for

estimating such probabilities, but it believes that EPA should adopt such estimates on
the grounds of policy. The report does not explain how it would estimate habit

probabilities, nor does it illustrate the consequences of itsproposed probilistic analysis.
I have strongly dissented; see Personal Supplementary Statement, supra note 3.
22 It is arguable whether the possibility that future humans will detect radioactivity

in water and remove it before using the water should be included in performance
assessment. A goal of geologic disposal is to dispose of the waste sufficiently carefully

so that future humans need not take action to protect themselves. Society now has
sensitive means of detecting contaminants in soil and ground water. There are many

instances in present society wherein contamination is known but remediation is
difficult or impracticable. It is not reasonable to presume constant monitoring of

ground water or tens and hundreds of millennia, let alone continued technical and
nancial capibility to perform such testing far into the future.
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effects would become acute, including prompt life threatening, rather
than the latent cancer and genetic effects assumed implicitly when
calculating the lower doses (ca. 10 mrem/year) that could be
considered for licensing.
Table 1
Subsistence-Farmer Doses that Could Result from
100 mrem/year Vicinity-Average Dose

EPRI's habit probability
EPRI's location probability
Calculated ratio of vicinity-average
dose to subsistence-farmer dose *
Calculated ratio of subsistence-farmer
dose to vicinity-average dose
Subsistence-farmer dose for
0.1rem/year average dose, rem/year

Small population

Small population,

current technology

advanced technology

0.11
0.018

0.0038
0.018

0.002

0.00007

500

14000

50

1400

Assumes 35 mile outer radius of population zone.
The dose ratio is equal to the product of the location probability and the habit probability.
The subsistence-farmer dose is for a subsistence farmer who uses contaminated ground water
from a well near the repository.

The corresponding concentrations of contaminants in ground water
23
would be millions of times higher than normally considered safe.
EPRI's calculational model and its estimated habit probabilities can
lead to even greater estimated doses to the reference subsistence farmer
due to early-time corrections, as discussed earlier.
Conclusion Concerning Vicinity-Average Allowable Dose
These calculations illustrate that determining compliance on the
basis of a vicinity-average dose, allowed to reach a level of 100
mrem/year, could expose some individuals to doses that would not be
tolerable in any reasonable analysis of public-health protection. Public
health is better protected by limiting the reasonable maximum
individual dose, as calculated for the reference subsistence farmer.
Limiting that dose is consistent with the recommendation of the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, the
23 The calculations do not consider self-limiting effects on ground water
concentrations, such as solubility.
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NRC's general public protection standard, the recommendation by the
International Commission for Radiological Protection, and the current
4
international consensus on health protection for geologic disposal.2
Ground-Water Protection
These calculations have much significance for ground-water
protection. The probabilities suggested by EPRI, 25 Wilems,2 6 and by
the TYMS committee 27 all serve to allow a greater concentration of
contaminants in ground water, by large factors. In its repromulgation of
40 C.F.R. § 191 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added
the requirement that a geologic repository should meet requirements
imposed by the Safe Drinking Water Act. If those requirements are to
apply to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, the ground water
would have to meet maximum contaminant levels (MCLs). There is
now some uncertainty as to what MCLs would be appropriate.
Whatever levels are set, there is the danger of exceeding those levels by
adopting the more lenient vicinity-average dose limit now proposed by
industry and Congress, as discussed above.
The traditional method of calculating MCLs is to assume that a
person drinks the contaminated water as his only source of drinking
water. The assumption is akin to that of the subsistence farmer, but
doses due to drinking contaminated water are typically more than
tenfold less than doses from eating food grown in contaminated water.
If the proposed vicinity-average dose were used, with a dose limit of
100 mrem/year, and assuming the probabilities adopted for Table 1,
drinking the contaminated ground water could result in annual doses
about tenfold lower than those estimated in Table 1 for the subsistence
farmer. Even without invoking EPRI's "habit probabilities", the
allowable doses from drinking contaminated ground water could still
be far above any tolerable levels for drinking water. Therefore, groundwater protection could easily be compromised by the proposed lenient
vicinity-average dose standard.
24

See references, supra note 3.

25 See EPRI, supra note 2.
26
27

See Wilems, supra note 13.

See Fri, supra note 7.
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Relaxing the Performance Requirements for a Geologic Repository
These calculations also illustrate how adopting probabilities 2 8 of
future human activities and locations could relax 29 the performance
requirements for a geologic repository. For example, EPRI and the
National Research Council's TYMS Committee proposed such
probabilistic analyses after learning of calculations by the Yucca
Mountain project 3 0 that the maximum calculated dose to the
reference subsistence farmer was as high as 30 rem/year. 3 1 EPRIs
probabilities in Table 1, proposed for a small population, would reduce
the vicinity-average dose estimates to 60 mrem/year (assuming current
technology for water purification) and to 2 mrem/year (assuming
advanced technology for water purification). The subsistence-farmer
dose of 30 rem/year (30,000 mrem/year) is 3,000 times greater than
the allowable individual dose of about 10 mrem/year now adopted in
the U.S. and abroad. However, the far more lenient limit of 100
mrem/year proposed 3 2 for the vicinity-average dose would not be
exceeded. For those who allow the low vicinity-average dose to obscure
the high individual dose, the repository would be said to be safe!
EPRI also estimates habit and location probabilities for a large
population in the vicinity surrounding Yucca Mountain. Assuming
advanced technology for detecting and mitigating contamination in
ground water, EPRI's probabilities are 0.5 for the location probability
and 5 x 10-8 for the habit probability, resulting in a ratio of average
dose to reference subsistence farmer dose of 2.5 x 10-8. If the reference
subsistence farmer dose is 30 rem/year, as quoted above from the 1994
Yucca Mountain report, the vicinity-average dose would be only 7.5 x
10-7 rem/year. Although the reference subsistence farmer dose greatly
exceeds any reasonable limit for an individual dose, the calculated
28 See Fri, supra note 7, EPRI supra note 2, Kessler, supra note 2 and Wilems,

supra note 13.
29 See Johnson, supra note 1, Pigford references supra note 2.
30 See Andrews et al., supra note 14.
31

The Yucca Mountain project acknowledges that the calculated dose is much too

high and would be unacceptable. It believes that the high dose is largely a result of
extreme conservatism in the choice of parameters and in modeling release of
radiocativity and its transport through the geosphere. It has underway several analysis
and experimental programs that are expected by the project to provide a technical

baiss for reducing the calculated dose.
32 See references, supra note 2, except Nuclear Energy Institute.
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vicinity-average dose would be far below the 100 mrem/year level
proposed 33 for public health protection.
If compliance with health protection standards were to be based on
the very low vicinity-average dose calculated above, the geologic
repository would seem to be better located in the midst of a
metropolitan desert community, such as Las Vegas! A contributor to
this bizarre conclusion is EPRI's expectation that the force and
technology of a large population would result in likely detection and
mitigation of contaminated well water. Also, the aquifer under Yucca
Mountain could supply contaminated water to only a limited number
of people. The additional people would have to obtain water and food
from uncontaminated sources, would receive low doses, and would
reduce the vicinity-average dose. If a vicinity-average dose limit were
adopted and if the much higher dose to the reasonable maximally
exposed individual were ignored, calculated population dilution by a
metropolitan area like Las Vegas could make Yucca Mountain
compliance easy, even if high individual doses could occur. Whether
the repository would be safe would be obscured by the faulty logic of a
vicinity-average dose limit.
The National Research Council's TYMS Report
The TYMS report 3 4 proposes to develop probabilities that could
lower the calculated average dose to a hypothetical critical group of
individuals in the vicinity. The critical group would include the
individual receiving maximum dose and all others whose doses are
within tenfold of the maximum. 35 The committee's proposal was
developed after the committee reviewed the high individual doses
calculated by the Yucca Mountain project 3 6 and after it reviewed
EPRI's probabilistic approach described above. I have strongly
33
34

Id.
See Fri, supranote 7.

35 Because of mathematical errors in Appendix C of the report, supra note 7 (see
Personal Supplementary Statement, supra note 3, Thomas H. Pigford, Invalidity of
the Probabilistic Exposure Scenario Proposed by the National Research Council's

TYMS Committee, Report UCB-NE-9523, Rev. 1, May (1996)), these two ICRP
criteria for the critical group could not both be fulfilled by the method endorsed by

the TYMS committee.
36

See Andrews et al., supra note 14.
I
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22

dissented from the Committee's proposed probabilistic critical group
on the grounds that there is no scientific basis for predicting
probabilistic distributions of habits of future people, that it would be an
unjustifiably lenient approach to public health protection, and that it
37
would do irreparable damage to the Yucca Mountain project.
One cannot yet estimate how low the calculated individual dose
would be using the TYMS approach, because the TYMS report does not
present example estimates of the probabilities that it advocates, nor
does it explain how such probabilities would be obtained. It does
acknowledge that there is no scientific basis for estimating such
probabilities.
However, the TYMS report does indicate that the authors may have
been thinking of the same kinds of probabilities that were described to
the committee by EPRI Appendix C of the TYMS report speaks of
calculating the probability that future people will be present over the
contaminated plume of ground water. This is akin to EPRI's location
probability described above. Also, the TYMS report and a member of
the TYMS committee 3 8 speak of the benefits of a future society
monitoring ground-water quality and either treating or avoiding use of
contaminated sources. This is a key feature of EPRI's habit probability,
particularly for an assumed future large population with advanced
technology.
Basing performance assessment on such conjured probabilities and
adopting a vicinity-average dose limit that requires estimates of such
probabilities are not the ingredients of a standard that would build
confidence by the scientific community and the public. The above
calculations illustrate that a standard that would limit the reasonable
maximum individual dose to a subsistence farmer is a far more reliable
means of ensuring public health protection from geologic disposal.
Summary
A new standard for protecting public health from the Yucca
Mountain repository for radioactive waste is proposed. It would limit
37 See Pigford references, supra note 3.
38 Chris G. Whipple, Comments Regarding the NAS Report on Yucca Mountain
Standards,Proceedings International Conference on High-Level Waste Management,
Las Vegas (1996.)
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the average radiation dose to a future population in the general vicinity,
instead of limiting the maximum dose to an individual. The standard
would allow the vicinity-average dose to be almost tenfold higher than
what is now adopted in this country and abroad as a limit for the
maximum dose. Calculational methods proposed by an advocate of
the new standard predict doses to individuals that could exceed
internationally accepted levels by factors of several thousand and more.
Concentrations of radioactivity in ground water in the vicinity could
exceed safe concentrations by factors of thousands. Safety problems of
a repository with a high maximum individual dose could be obscured
by low calculated values of the vicinity-average dose.
Instead, the standard for Yucca Mountain should limit the annual
radiation dose to the reasonable maximally exposed individual. For
estimating compliance with radiation protection standards for geologic
disposal, national and international radiation protection agencies and
bodies have long calculated reasonable maximum exposures for future
subsistence farmers, who drink contaminated ground water and obtain
a substantial portion of their food from crops irrigated by it. If the
reasonable maximum dose estimate is within acceptable limits, the
doses to others, who by definition should receive lower doses, will also
be acceptable [see Appendix]. This is accepted international practice for
protection of public from disposal of radioactive waste in geologic
repositories. Subsistence farming is not rare. Family farms are a way of
life for many residents in the Amargosa Valley, who use ground water
39
from an aquifer that flows under Yucca Mountain.
The project needs a standard stringent enough to build confidence
in the face of legal and political challenges. At present no scientific bases
exist to support a policy less stringent than that now used in the U.S.
and in other countries. Policy makers must reject pressures for shortterm expediency and economy lest, by enacting policy that
compromises scientific validity and credibility, they undermine public
confidence and end needed nuclear research and application.

39 Supra note 1.
8 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 9 [Winter 1997]

Appendix
Various Interpretations of "Maximum Individual Dose"
The dose to the "reference subsistence farmer" should not be confused
with a dose to the "hypothetical maximally exposed individual", as used in
many studies. The "reference subsistence farmer" would be the individual who
receives the highest dose, among all those individuals considered in calculating
radiation doses. However, some individuals could receive higher doses, such as
individuals with unusual sensitivity to radiation or with unusual diets. It has
been the policy or practice in the international community to calculate
protection to future individuals whose diets and sensitivity to radiation are
typical of present-day people in the vicinity.
Further, the reference subsistence-farmer doses calculated in performance
assessment of geologic repositories are not the maximum doses that could be
received even by a subsistence farmer. As explained elsewhere, 4 0 it is the
practice to express uncertainties in geosphere parameters as probabilistic
distributions of those parameters. The doses calculated are the expected values
of the resulting probabilistic distribution of doses, not the doses at the highdose end of the distribution. The highest dose of that distribution is referred
to by EPA as the Theoretical Upper Bound Estimate (TUBE). It is calculated
by assuming most unfavorable and conservative values of each parameter that
affects the dose calculation. This extremely conservative deterministic
calculation of the TUBE is not the calculated subsistence-farmer dose referred
to herein. Here "dose" is understood to be calculated as the mean of the
probabilistic distribution of doses. The probabilistic distribution of doses is to
be calculated based on scientifically based distributions of parameters that
affect those calculations.
Thus, several examples of calculation of doses to a "hypothetical
maximally exposed individual" are far more conservative and extreme than
the subsistence-farmer calculation that is international practice. In the current
language of the EPA, the dose calculated to the reference subsistence farmer
could be better construed as the calculated "reasonable maximum dose".

40 See Andrews et al., supra note 14.

